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U.S. Decapitalization, Easy Money, 
and Asset Price Cycles
Kevin Dowd and Martin Hutchinson
In Matthew 25: 14–30, Jesus recounts the Parable of the Talents,
the story of how the master goes away and leaves each of three 
servants with sums of money to look after in his absence. He then
returns and holds them to account. The first two have invested wisely
and give the master a good return, and he rewards them. The third,
however, is a wicked servant who couldn’t be bothered even to put
the money in the bank where it could earn interest. Instead, he 
simply buried the money and gave his master a zero return. He is
punished and thrown into the darkness where there is weeping and
wailing and gnashing of teeth.
In the modern American version of the parable, the eternal
truth of the original remains: Good stewardship is as important as
it always was and there is still one master—the American public
(albeit in name only)—who entrusts capital to the stewardship of
his supposed servants. Instead of three, however, there are now
only two: the Federal Reserve and the federal government. They
are not especially wicked, but they certainly are incompetent. They
run amok and manage to squander so much of their master’s cap-
ital that he is ultimately ruined, and it is he rather than they who
goes on to suffer an eternity of wailing and teeth-gnashing, not
to mention impoverishment. For their part, the two incompetent
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servants deny all responsibility, as politicians always do, and since
there is no accountability (let alone Biblical justice) in the modern
version, ride off into the sunset insisting that none of this was 
their fault.
U.S. Asset Bubbles: Past and Present
The story starts with the Federal Reserve. Since October 1979,
under Paul Volcker’s chairmanship, the Fed’s primary monetary pol-
icy goal had been the fight against inflation, a fight he went on to win
though at great cost. Given this background, many monetarists were
alarmed by Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan’s formal abandonment of
monetarism in July 1993, but a subsequent tightening of policy in
1994–95 had caused satisfactory amounts of distress on Wall Street
and seemed to indicate that the overall thrust of policy had not in fact
changed.
The great change in U.S. monetary policy, so far as it can be
dated, came early in 1995. In his biannual Humphrey-Hawkins
testimony to Congress on February 22–23, Greenspan indicated
that his program of rate rises, the last to a 6 percent Fed funds rate
on February 1st that year, had ended. Elliptical as ever,
Greenspan’s hint of easing was veiled: “There may come a time
when we hold our policy stance unchanged, or even ease, despite
adverse price data, should we see that underlying forces are acting
ultimately to reduce price pressures” (Greenspan 1995: 17). 
The Dow Jones Index rose above 4,000 the following day, and was
off to the races.
By December 5, 1996, the Dow was already at 6,400, and
Greenspan famously expressed his doubts about the market’s
“irrational exuberance.” Nonetheless, he did nothing tangible to
reinforce his skepticism and pushed interest rates generally down-
ward over the next three years. In July 1997, he then came up with
an explanation of why the high stock market might not be so exces-
sive after all. In his usual Delphic manner, he remarked that
“important pieces of information, while just suggestive at this
point, could be read as indicating basic improvements in the
longer-term efficiency of our economy” (Greenspan 1997: 2). 
The press seized on these utterances as confirming a “productivity
miracle” that turned out later (like its predecessors the Philips
curve and the Loch Ness monster) to be a myth, but not before it
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gave a nice boost to tech stocks in particular, which positively
boomed. Only in 1999 did Greenspan begin to take action, push-
ing Fed funds rate upward to an eventual peak of 6.5 percent in
2000, by which time tech stock prices had reached stratospheric
levels and then soon crashed.
The cycle then repeated. In January 2001, Greenspan began a
series of interest rate cuts that saw the Fed funds rate fall to 1 per-
cent in 2003, its lowest since 1961. He held it at that rate for a year
and short-term interest rates were to remain below inflation for
almost four years. This was a much more aggressive monetary policy,
and the results were entirely predictable. In Steve Hanke’s (2008)
memorable phrase, there was “the mother of all liquidity cycles and
yet another massive demand boom,” the most notable feature of
which was the real estate boom. The rest is history.1
Greenspan’s successor Ben Bernanke then continued his prede-
cessor’s loose monetary policy with missionary zeal. He brought
the Fed funds rate, which the Fed had belatedly pulled up to 
5.25 percent in 2006 and held there for a year, back down to 2 per-
cent by the onset of the crisis in September 2008. By then the rate
of growth of MZM, the best currently available proxy for broad
money, had been running into double digits for some time. Over
the next six months MZM increased at an annual rate of 20.4 per-
cent, while the monetary base doubled. Over this same period, the
Fed funds rate was brought down from 2 percent to a mere 
25 basis points, at which level it has remained ever since, and these
easy money policies were supplemented with nearly $2 trillion in
quantitative easing (QE). After March 2009, the monetary aggre-
gates then remained flat for a year, but in April 2010 MZM started
to rise again (at an annualized rate of 6.8 percent in the six months
to October 2010) and, as we write, the Fed is embarking on
QE2—with yet another $600 billion in quantitative easing due to
hit the system.
If past expansionary monetary policies led to bubbles, then we
should expect the even more expansionary policies pursued since
the onset of the crisis to produce new bubbles, and this is exactly
what we find. Within the United States, there are at least three very
1There are many excellent accounts of this story. We particularly recommend
O’Driscoll (2009), Hanke (2008), Norberg (2009), and Woods (2009). See also
Dowd and Hutchinson (2010).
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obvious bubbles currently in full swing, each fuelled by the flood of
cheap money: Treasuries, financials, and junk bonds.2
The Treasury bond market has seen a massive boom since 2007,
fuelled by a combination of large government deficits, enormous
investor demand, and low interest rates pushing prices up to record
levels.
The current “recovery” in financial stocks is almost entirely an
artificial bubble. The Fed’s interest rate policy allows banks to 
borrow short-term at close to zero and invest at 3 percent or so in
long-term Treasuries and about 4.5 percent in mortgage bonds,
which are now openly guaranteed by the federal government. This
enables banks to sit back with their spreads of at least 3 percent,
leveraged 20 times to give a comfortable gross return of more than
60 percent. Becoming a yield curve player is far more profitable
and avoids all the tiresome effort and risk of lending to small busi-
ness. It is therefore no wonder that lending to small and medium
enterprises—on which economic recovery really depends—
remains, at best, anemic. The result is a bizarre situation in which
the banks appear to recover while their supposed core activity—
lending—remains stuck. The reality, of course, is that lending is no
longer their core business.
The banks’ true weakness is confirmed by other factors. Current
accounting rules, so-called fair value accounting rules, artificially
inflate banks’ profitability in many ways. In practice, “fair value”
(sometimes known as “marked-to-market” accounting but, in reality,
“mark-to-model” accounting) boils down to giving practitioners
license to abuse financial models for their own ends. This allows
them to hide true losses and loot the system: you use a model to 
create fictitious valuations and hence fictitious profits, and then pay
yourself a handsome (and very real) bonus for the “profit” you have
created. Needless to add, such practices are all the more damaging
because they are so hidden.
Clever financial engineers are always finding ingenious ways to
game the system and are currently very much hard at it. Many of the
2There are also major bubbles overseas, most notably those in the Chinese and
Indian real estate markets, and which (given the reserve currency status of the
dollar and the huge expansions in these countries’ dollar holdings over a long
period) are also due, in part, to the same expansionary Federal Reserve policies.
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most lucrative of these schemes involve gaming the Basel capital
rules to create fictitious profits and “unlock” capital that can then be
used to pay bonuses to clever financial engineers and their man-
agers. Such practices secretly decapitalize the banks and are of
course just another form of looting. The banks are able to continue
operating only because they are on government life support,
propped up by repeated bailouts (including lender of last resort
lending, TARP, government purchases of bank equity, and repeated
large-scale quantitative easing) and government guarantees (includ-
ing too-big-to-fail, deposit insurance, and blanket guarantees of
home mortgages).
A third bubble is in junk—that is, sub-investment grade corpo-
rate bonds. In the year to September 15, 2010, junk bond issues
raised $168.5 billion, more than the 2009 full-year record of $163
billion, and which itself represented an annual increase in total
outstanding junk bonds of over 200 percent. Such growth is
extraordinary in the deepest recession since World War II.
Moreover, much of this growth takes the form of “covenant-lite”
bonds, which had been thought an aberration of the 2006–07 
bubble. The key factor driving this growth would appear to be low
interest rates. These not only reduce borrowing costs and stimu-
late borrowing, itself encouraged by the tax-deductibility of debt,
they also suppress yields on Treasuries, which encourages yield-
seeking investors to go for junk. The same causal factors have also
given a big boost to the leveraged buy-out (LBO) market, not least
in so far as they have allowed company after company to avoid
bankruptcy (and indeed prosper, temporarily) through aggressive
refinancing (see Hutchinson 2010).
Each of these bubbles was characterized by obvious irra-
tionality. In the tech boom, Pets.com, based on the idea that
there was money to be made by Fedexing cat food around the
country, made its IPO in February 2000 amid a welter of Super
Bowl ads, but went bankrupt a mere 288 days later. In the 
housing bubble, NINJA and “no doc” loans were made with no
concern for whether they would or could ever be repaid, and
house prices in some parts of the country were at 8–10 times
annual income.
With interest rates so low, the prices of Treasuries are close to
their peak and the only major change can be down; investors face a
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classic one-way bet scenario. In such circumstances the only rational
response is to sell and yet investors’ money still pours in.3
In the current financials market, we have the irrationality of the
banks apparently profitable and prospering while the credit system is
still jammed up and most of them remain dependent on government
life support to continue in operation. In the current junk bonds 
market, we have the irrationality of a major boom in lending to the
riskiest corporate customers taking place in the middle of a major
credit crunch, with the certain knowledge that many of these bor-
rowers will default when interest rates rise.
We can be confident that these current bubbles will come to
unpleasant ends like their predecessors, but on a potentially much
grander scale. The bubbles will then burst in quick succession.
Sooner rather than later, it will dawn on investors that Treasuries are
overvalued and confidence in the Treasuries market will crack. One
possibility is that rising inflation expectations or higher deficits will
then push up market interest rates, causing bond prices to falter and
then fall. An even more imminent prospect is that some combination
of the Fed’s quantitative easing, unsustainable federal budget
deficits, and the U.S. balance of payments deficit will cause a further
decline in the dollar that makes foreign holders of Treasury bonds
lose confidence. There is then likely to be a rush to the exits—a flight
from Treasuries on a massive scale—forcing up interest rates and
inflicting heavy losses on bondholders, especially on those holding
long-term bonds.
The collapse of the Treasuries market will cause the banks’ previ-
ously profitable “gapping” adventure to unravel with a vengeance:
the very positions that yielded them such easy returns will now 
suffer large capital losses. Confidence in the banks—never strong
since the onset of the crisis—will collapse (again) and we will enter a
new (and severe) banking crisis.
The bursting of the Treasuries and financials bubbles will then
feed through to the junk bond bubble, leading to sharp falls in the
values of corporate bonds and sharp rises in credit spreads. Highly
3To give a simple illustration, take a Treasury bond with a duration (average time
to cash flow) equal to say 25 years. Using conventional duration analysis, a rise in
interest rates of just 1 percent would lead to a capital loss of 25 percent. At the
same time, with interest rates so low and the government flooding the market
with more debt, thanks to its gaping borrowing requirements, the bond has little
chance of going up in price.
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leveraged firms will then default in droves, the junk bond market will
collapse, and LBO activity will dry up.
We also have to consider the nontrivial knock-on effects. The
collapse of Treasuries will trigger an immediate financing crisis
for governments at all levels, especially the federal government.
The likely downgrading of its AAA credit rating will further
intensify the government’s chronic financing problems. Nor
should we forget that these financial tsunamis are likely to over-
whelm the Federal Reserve, which already has a highly leveraged
balance sheet.
There is also the problem of resurgent inflation. For a long
time, the United States has been protected from much of the infla-
tionary impact of Federal Reserve policies. Developments in IT
and the cost reductions attendant on the outsourcing of produc-
tion to Asian economies had the impact of suppressing prices and
masking the domestic impact of Fed policies. Instead, these poli-
cies produced a massive buildup in global currency reserves,
helped fuel soaring commodity prices, and contributed to inflation
in countries such as India and China. U.S. inflation was already 
rising by 2008, at more than 3 percent, but that rise was put into
reverse when bank lending and consumer spending fell sharply.
However, there are three good reasons to think that inflation will
soon take off again. First, the combination of booming commodity
prices and a depreciating dollar means that imports will cost more
in dollar terms and this must inevitably feed through to U.S. infla-
tion. Second, rising labor costs in the Asian economies mean that
the outsourcing movement is coming to an end and even begin-
ning to reverse itself, and with it the associated cost reductions for
American firms that outsource to Asia. Third, and most impor-
tantly, there is the huge additional monetary overhang created
over the past couple of years. The Fed’s vast monetization of 
government debt must eventually flood forth—and, when it does,
inflation is likely to rise sharply.
Once inflation makes a comeback, a point will eventually come
when the Fed’s easy money policy has to go into sharp reverse, and
interest rates will have to be hiked to slow down monetary growth.
The consequences will be most unpleasant. Moreover, as in the early
1980s, higher interest rates will lead to major falls in asset prices and
inflict further losses on financial institutions, wiping out their capital
bases in the process. Thus, renewed inflation and higher interest
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rates would deliver yet another blow to an already gravely weakened
financial system.
The Decapitalizing Effects of Repeated Bubbles
Federal Reserve monetary policy over the past 15 years or so has
produced bubble after bubble, and each bubble (or each group of
contemporaneous bubbles) is bigger in aggregate and more damag-
ing than the one that preceded it. Each bubble destroys part of the
capital stock by diverting capital into economically unjustified uses.
Artificially low interest rates make investments appear more prof-
itable than they really are, and this is especially so for investments
with long-term horizons—in Austrian terms, there is an artificial
lengthening of the investment horizon (see Hanke 2010).4 These 
distortions and resulting losses are magnified further once a bubble
takes hold and inflicts its damage too. The end result is a lot of ruined
investors and “bubble blight”—massive overcapacity in the sectors
affected.5 This has happened again and again, in one sector after
another—tech, real estate, Treasuries, financials, and junk—and the
same policy also helps to spawn bubbles overseas, mostly notable in
commodities and emerging markets.
We also have to consider how periods of prolonged low (and often
sub-zero) real interest rates have led to sharply reduced saving and,
hence, led to lower capital accumulation over time. U.S. savings rates
have fallen progressively since the early 1980s, falling from nearly 
12 percent to little more than zero in recent years.
Even without federal budget deficits, it is manifestly obvious that
U.S. savings rates over the last two decades are inadequate to provide
for the maintenance, let alone growth, of the U.S. capital stock 
4We can illustrate this impact by applying duration analysis familiar from bond
market analysis. If an investment with given expected future cash flows has a
duration (or average time to cash flows) of T years, then a fall in interest rates of
1 percent will increase the value of the investment by about T percent. 
The impact on asset values will be ameliorated if longer-term rates do not fall so
much, but the essential story still holds.
5We gloss over various knock-on effects. One such effect is that the lowering of
short-term interest rates depresses yields, which encourages investors to look for
higher-yielding investment outlets. In turn, this effect reduces credit spreads and
diverts capital from low-risk to higher-risk investments such as junk bonds or
emerging markets. If Vietnam, for example, can then raise money almost as 
easily as Ohio, then capital will be diverted to lower-cost Vietnam and U.S. 
manufacturing jobs will migrate with it.
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(or, for that matter, its citizens’ desires for a secure retirement). The
U.S. economy is effectively eating its own seed-corn. Now add in the
impact of federal budget deficits of around 10 percent of GDP and
we see that the deficits alone take up more than the economy’s entire
savings, without a penny left over for investment. It then becomes
necessary to supply U.S. capital needs by foreign borrowing—thus
the persistent and worrying balance of payments deficits. But even
this borrowing is not enough. Hence, over the long term, low inter-
est rates are decapitalizing the U.S. economy, with damaging long-
term implications for its residents’ living standards. In the long run,
low interest rates lead to low saving and capital decline, and they in
turn lead to stagnation and eventually to the prospect of declining 
living standards as America ceases to be a capital-rich economy.
How Government Destroys Capital
We should also see these problems against the context of a vast
number of other government policies that are decapitalizing the U.S.
economy in myriad other ways. The wastefulness of government
infrastructure projects is of course legendary. One instance is the
Amtrak proposal for a Boston-Washington high speed railroad,
costed at $117 billion, compared to $20 billion equivalent for similar
lines in France and under $10 billion for a line recently opened in
China. Even more striking is the ARC tunnel project between
Manhattan and New Jersey, recently killed by Governor Christie
because of its excessive cost of $8.7 billion plus likely overruns. 
Yet the Holland Tunnel, performing an identical function and
opened by President Coolidge in November 1927, came in at 
$48 million, equivalent to $606 million in 2010 dollars. Even allow-
ing for the higher real wages of today’s construction labor, and a cer-
tain amount of fiddling of the consumer price statistics by the BLS,
it should have been possible to bring the ARC project in at under
$1.5–2 billion, less than a quarter of the actual projected cost. The
high costs of infrastructure problems boil down to the onerous regu-
lations under which such projects are carried out, such as the 1931
Davis-Bacon mandate to use union labor on federally funded proj-
ects and a whole welter of health and safety and environmental reg-
ulations, which massively push up overheads.
We also have to consider the impact of government fiscal policy.
Large government deficits reduce capital accumulation in so far as
31202_Ch09_Dowd-Hutchinson.qxd  9/15/11  1:53 PM  Page 513
514
Cato Journal
they crowd out private investments. Large levels of government debt
also reduce capital accumulation in so far as they imply large burdens
on future taxpayers that reduce their ability (not to mention their
willingness) to save. The U.S. budget deficit has risen from less than
2 percent of GDP in 2007 to more than 10 percent.6 In the process,
official debt has grown from almost 64 percent of GDP in 2007 to
more than 94 percent. Unless the U.S. can get its fiscal house in
order, its credit rating will suffer, as all three major rating agencies
will downgrade U.S. debt, not just S&P.
Yet even these grim figures are merely the tip of a much bigger
iceberg. The official debt of the United States, large as it is, is
dwarfed by its unofficial debt: the Social Security and other entitle-
ments (Medicare, Medicaid, and others) to which the federal govern-
ment has committed itself, but not provided for—that is, additional
debts that future taxpayers are expected to pay for. Recent estimates
of the size of this debt are hair-raising. Using CBO figures, Laurence
Kotlikoff (2010) estimated that this debt is now $202 trillion, or 
15 times the official debt and nearly 14 times annual U.S. GDP,
implying that the average U.S. citizen would need to spend almost 
14 years to pay off this debt. No wonder Kotlikoff matter-of-factly
concluded that the United States is bankrupt.
The U.S. debt burden implies punitive tax rates on future employ-
ment income and major disincentives to work or at least declare
income. Moreover, excessive public debt will greatly discourage
future capital accumulation as investors will (rightly) fear that there
is little point building up investments that will eventually be expro-
priated by the government.7
6We gloss over here the vast amount of waste and loss (much of it not even
estimable) in recent federal government spending programs: TARP and other
bank bailouts, the AIG rescue, the rescue of Fannie and Freddie ($360 billion),
the $1 trillion or so FHA loans made since it stepped in during the crash (and no
one yet knows how many are bad), cash for clunkers and the auto bailouts, the
over-hyped American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and quantitative easing.
7Indeed, it would appear that the U.S. government is already laying the ground-
work. The recently passed Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act requires U.S.
taxpayers to inform the IRS of their foreign investments, and also requires 
foreign funds to name their U.S. investors on pain of a flat 30 percent confisca-
tion tax each year. As one (non-U.S.) institutional investor informed us in private
correspondence, “Naturally, we are divesting ourselves of all U.S. holdings.” This
does not augur well for the future of the United States as a magnet for foreign
investors; it also raises specter of the seizure of private gold holdings in 1934.
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Long-Term Outlook for the U.S. Economy
The long-term effect of U.S. economic decapitalization will not
necessarily be apparent in day-to-day headlines. Instead, the process
will be almost glacial: mostly slow but utterly devastating in its
longer-term impact.
For all of its history, the United States has enjoyed many advan-
tages over most other countries: abundant wealth and capital, world-
class education and technology, a highly innovative culture and,
underpinning these, a freer economy. However, the U.S. economy is
now far less free than it used to be 80 or more years ago. Partly
because of this, but partly because of the natural ongoing processes
of globalization, the United States is steadily losing its other advan-
tages as well. Owing to globalization and the outsourcing and trans-
fer of wealth that has brought about, the United States has long lost
many of its advantages of technology and education against Europe
and Japan. The same process then started relative to the small “tiger”
economies of East Asia and, more recently, relative to the giant Asian
economies of China and India, whose wage levels are still only a frac-
tion of those of the United States. In the long run, American citizens
can expect higher living standards than Chinese or Indian citizens
only if they maintain some edge over them. However, as the U.S.
capital stock gradually dissipates and the capital stocks of emerging
Asian economies increase, that edge will become increasingly tenu-
ous and living standards will converge. Consequently, over the long
term, there is no reason to expect U.S. living standards to exceed
those in countries such as China, Malaysia, Thailand, and Brazil that
are coming to equal the United States in many of its factor inputs.
Americans might also take heed from the experiences of other
once wealthy countries whose economies were crippled by progres-
sive decapitalization. Britain was still a wealthy country at the very
frontier of technological advance in the late 1930s. However, when
World War II broke out the government took complete control of
the economy and seized its entire capital stock, foreign investments
and all. Over the next decades a bloated state sector and onerous
controls deprived British industry of the capital it needed to refit, and
the country went into long-term economic decline. By the late 1970s,
in consequence, Britain was being referred to as the new “sick man
of Europe” and British living standards by the late 1970s were 
30 percent lower than its European competitors’ and half those in
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the United States. By contrast, West Germany, which had suffered
much more devastation in the war and the loss of most of its physical
infrastructure, rebounded quickly under the free-market policies
implemented by Konrad Adenauer and Ludwig Erhard from 1948,
and soon rebuilt both its capital stock and its prosperity.
Another role model to avoid is Argentina, one of the world’s
wealthiest economies in 1930, with enormous foreign exchange
reserves from wartime trading as late as 1945, which embarked 
on wildly extravagant schemes of corruption, nationalization, and
income redistribution. Successive governments tried to restore
Argentina’s position—it was after all superbly endowed with
resources and in the 1940s had a highly competitive education 
system—but without adequate access to capital were unable to do so.
The result was progressive impoverishment, repeated debt defaults,
and the country’s descent into its present socialist squalor, in which
even with high commodity prices it comes between Gabon and Libya
in the global table of GDP per capita. This could well be the fate of
a decapitalized United States if current policies persist.
What Can Be Done?
Radical reforms will be needed if U.S. living standards are to
improve. Any reforms need to be based on a diagnosis of the under-
lying problems, however, and one of the most important of these is,
quite simply, that U.S. policymakers place too much emphasis on the
short term and fail to take adequate account of longer-term conse-
quences. Nor should this be any surprise: the political environment
in which they operate—the fact that they are accountable only over
limited terms of office—encourages them to focus on the short term,
so it is only to be expected that they would respond to such 
incentives. What happens after their watch is not their problem.
As far as monetary policy is concerned, these short-termist incen-
tives create an inbuilt expansionary bias that has manifested itself in
repeated asset price bubbles and now the prospect of renewed 
inflation. The solution is to create institutional barriers to contain 
this bias. The key is to reduce or eliminate the Fed’s discretionary 
powers, putting a stop to those who would meddle with the short-
term interest rate and so kill the asset bubble cycle at its root. Interest
rates would then be higher (and more stable) than they have been
over recent years, and thus provide a stronger incentive for saving.
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One possible reform would be to “Volckerize” the Fed and give it
a single overriding objective—price stability—and reform its institu-
tional structure to protect its independence from the federal govern-
ment. A far better reform—and a far more appropriate one given the
Fed’s dismal record since its founding—would be to abolish the
Federal Reserve and anchor the dollar to a sound commodity 
standard. A natural choice would be a gold standard, with the cur-
rency issued by commercial banks but pegged to and redeemable in
gold. Interest rates and the money supply would then no longer be
determined by central bankers but by market forces subject to the
discipline of the gold standard. An alternative anchor might be some
broader commodity basket, which has the additional attraction of
promising greater price-level stability than a gold standard .8
Yet monetary reform on its own will not be enough to reverse the
destruction of U.S. capital. The federal government also needs to
reform its own vast range of capital-destroying policies. Such reforms
would include the following:9
• Government should stop meddling in the financial system.
It should stop giving guarantees such as mortgage guarantees
or deposit insurance guarantees, and it should implement
measures to prevent future bailouts and abolish government-
supported enterprises such as Fannie and Freddie, whose
machinations have devastated the U.S. housing market.
• Reformers should acknowledge the tendency of government to
grow and be excessively short-term focused, and push for a sys-
tematic program that will cut government back and limit any
8An example of such a scheme is the “almost ideal monetary rule’ suggested by
Dowd (1999). The idea is to create a monetary rule that stabilizes the CPI with-
out the central bank having to buy and sell the CPI basket of goods and services
itself, which would obviously not be feasible. Instead, the Fed creates a new form
of CPI-based financial derivative that would be a perpetual American put option
on the U.S. CPI, the term “American” here being used in the sense of standard
options language to refer to an option with unrestricted early exercise rights. The
Fed would then buy and sell these contracts on demand at a fixed price, and the
system is so designed that its only zero-arbitrage equilibrium is one in which the
expected change in the future CPI is zero, ensuring that the system delivers
price-level stability. In our (preferred) free-banking version of the scheme, com-
mercial banks would be allowed to issue dollar-money on this same basis, and the
Fed could then be abolished.
9For more on these reform proposals, see Dowd and Hutchinson (2010).
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future growth, the goal being to return the government back to
the levels of the Coolidge administration (motto: “the business
of America is business”) in the 1920s.
• A range of tax reforms is needed to abolish tax-based incen-
tives to borrow. Moreover, the government should remove
tax penalties from saving, investing, and transferring capital
between generations.
• Government should tackle major budget imbalances. This
requires a major reversal of current expansionary fiscal policies.
The longer-term fiscal prospects for the United States are dire,
but the good news is that most actuarial deficits are not so much
hard and fast debt obligations as projections of what would happen
if current policies persist, and there are obvious economies that
can be made once the U.S. government finds the courage to tackle
these problems. Moreover, recent political developments—in 
particular, the recent Congressional elections, the rise of the Tea
Party movement, and increasing dissatisfaction with the Federal
Reserve—suggest that the United States is at least beginning to
move in the right direction.
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